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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,
Case No. 870518-CA
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Priority 2

vs.
JOHN R. RASCON,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
I
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is the use of dental cream a "foreign substance" within

the meaning of State v. Baker disqualifying the intoxilyzer
results as a matter of law?
2.

Was there adequate foundation to admit Appellant-

Rascon's expert opinion regarding the effect of the alleged use
of dental cream by this appellant upon the intoxilyzer test?
3.

Even if the intoxilyzer test results were inadmissible,

was it harmless error to admit the test results under the
undisputed facts of this case?
4.

Does the failure of Appellant-Rascon to submit written

findings and an order following a pretrial suppression hearing,
combined with his failure to renew the motion or otherwise make
any reference at trial to the prior ruling, constitute a waiver
of his right to appeal a denial of a pretrial motion to suppress?

II
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor, following a jury
trial in the Fifth Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake Department,
the Honorable Maurice D. Jones presiding.
Ill
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant-Rascon was convicted by a jury in the Fifth
Circuit Court of violating a City ordinance prohibiting operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Appellant

now seeks relief from the Utah Court of Appeals, claiming that
the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress justifies reversal
of the conviction,
IV
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS
Appellant-Radeon was convicted by a jury in the Fifth
Circuit Court.

Tfte Fifth Circuit Court declined to issue a

certificate of probable cause.
V

The facts, wften viewed in a light favorable to upholding the
jury verdict, demonstrate the following.
1.

On June 30, 1987 at approximately 1:45 a.m. the

arresting officer observed the Appellant-Rascon walking west on
Fourth South Street near State Street.
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Appellant-Rascon was

staggering as he walked up to his car, and he fumbled around with
his keys trying to enter the vehicle.
2.

(Tr-25).

After Appellant-Rascon entered the vehicle he drove in

a westerly direction on 400 South in an erratic fashion.

He

repeatedly crossed over the lane line into the other lane of
traffic and accelerated very rapidly between semaphore lights
reaching speeds of up to 40 m.p.h., although the speed limit was
30 m.p.h.

After following for two blocks, the officer pulled the

vehicle over for an illegal lane change.
3.

The arresting officer approached the vehicle and asked

Appellant-Rascon for his driver's license.
have a license on his person.

The subject did not

At that time the officer detected

the odor of an alcoholic beverage.
4.

(Tr-26,27).

(Tr-27,29).

Upon request, Appellant-Rascon got out of the car.

He

was unsteady on his feet and several times had to support himself
against the officer's vehicle.
speech was "thick".
5.

His eyes were bloodshot and his

(Tr-29,30).

Thereafter, the officer had Appellant-Rascon perform

three field sobriety tests (Tr-30-34): a heel-toe test, a finger
counting test, and an alphabet recitation test.
failed each test; he:

Mr. Rascon

(a) had difficulty reciting the alphabet

from A to Z, forgetting some letters and not completing the
recitation (Tr-33); (b) he tried the finger counting test, but
could not count and was unable to coordinate it or finish the
test (Tr-33); and (c) on attempting the heel-toe test, he was
unable to perform it without staggering considerably and had to

sidestep to regain his balance (Tr-33).

After the tests were

performed, the arresting officer placed the Appellant-Rascon
under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
(Tr-36).
6.

Appellant-Rascon was taken to the main police station

where an intoxilyzer test was administered by an officer duly
trained in the use of the intoxilyzer machine.

(Tr-38, 46-48).

The test was administered within an hour of the arrest and showed
a blood alcohol level of .25%.

(Tr-52-5-6, Exhibits P-2 and P-5

following Record-74).
7.

At the police station, prior to the* administration of

the intoxilyzer test, both the arresting officer and the officer
who administered the intoxilyzer test examined Appellant-Rasconfs
mouth.

One of the officers shined a flashlight into the mouth,

and neither officer observed any foreign substances therein.
(Tr-11,12,45,56 ).

Officer Cory Lyman asked Appellant-Rascon if

he had anything in his mouth; Appellant-Rascon indicated he did
not.

(Tr-46).

The officers kept the subject under observation

for a period of approximately 30 minutes before the test was
administered.

Both observed that Appellant-Rciscon took nothing

by mouth during that time.
8.

(Tr-14,45,56,49).

On August 28, 1987, a hearing was held before the

Honorable Maurice Jones of the Fifth Circuit Court on a defense
motion to suppress the results of the intoxilyzer test.
(Tr-1-18).

At that hearing, Appellant-Rascon testified that he

was wearing dentures on the date he was arrested and that at some

time prior he had used a type of cream as an adhesive to keep the
dentures in place.
9.

(Tr-1,2).

Appellant-Rascon offered similar testimony regarding

the dentures and cream during the trial.

(Tr-100).

At neither

the suppression hearing nor during the trial did the Appellant
state how long before his arrest he had applied the denture cream
nor the type of cream used.

He did not deny that he had

indicated to the officers at the time they inspected his mouth
that he had nothing in his mouth, nor did he produce any evidence
to contradict the officers' testimony regarding their inspection
of his mouth or regarding the thirty minute observation period
prior to the test.
10.

At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ahmed Tafesh, testi-

fying in behalf of Mr. Rascon, stated that he had read of one
study which was performed in the State of Colorado in which an
intoxilyzer test was administered upon a person who had used
denture cream and which concluded that the test result was
falsely inflated.

(Tr-7-10).

Based upon that one study Mr.

Tafesh expressed the opinion that the results of the intoxilyzer
test administered upon Appellant-Rascon would have been falsely
high due to the use of denture cream.

(Tr-5,6).

Mr. Tafesh

admitted that he had not performed any such tests regarding
dentures nor denture cream himself.

Further, he did not indicate

the degree of inflation or express an opinion that Appellant's
test would have been below the legal limit.

(Appellant-Rascon's

actual test result of .25% was more than three times the
prohibited .08%. )
11.

The Colorado study did not identify the number of

people participating in the study nor did it identify the type of
cream used.

(Tr-6,9,10).

The study did not indicate the

conditions of the subjects at the time of the tests, and it did
not identify the type of alcohol used.

(Tr-16).

Further, it did

not suggest that a denture cream could inflate the alcohol
results by a magnitude of 300%, as would be required in this
case.

(Tr-16).

Rather, the "expert"-Tafesh-admitted he could

not quantify the degree of inflation.
12.

(Tr-6-7).

Following the testimony at the suppression hearing the

Court denied Appellant-Rascon1s motion to suppress on the grounds
that Mr. Rascon had failed to meet his burden of establishing
that the intoxilyzer test results should be suppressed, as a
matter of law.
13.

(Tr-16,17).

A jury trial was held on October 9, 1987.

No findings

of fact and conclusions of law, no written order denying the
pretrial motion to suppress, and no signed minute entry were ever
entered into the record.

At the time of the introduction by the

prosecution of the intoxilyzer test results, Appellant-Rascon
made no objection to the introduction of said evidence.

At no

time during the trial did Appellant-Rascon refer in any way to
the previous order of denial of the motion to suppress or in any
way renew that motion.

(See entire trial transcript, Tr-19-118).
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14.

During the trial, Mr. Ahmed Tafesh was allowed to

testify at length in behalf of Appellant-Rascon.

(Tr-106-112) .

The court refused to qualify Mr. Tafesh as an expert, and
therefore refused to allow him to express an opinion as to the
effect of the denture cream upon the intoxilyzer test results in
this case.

(Tr-108-109).

That refusal was based upon a lack of

foundation for such an expert opinion, in the following respects:
(a)

Mr. Tafesh had never personally run any blood

alcohol tests involving the intoxilyzer nor conducted any
studies regarding the effect of dentures or denture
fixatives upon intoxilyzer test result (Tr-6,7,125);
(b)

Mr. Tafesh could cite only one study which he had

read, the results of which were published in Colorado
(Tr-7-10,16,125);
(c)

That study:
(1)

Did not identify the number of participants

(Tr-9,16);
(2)

Did not identify the conditions of the

subjects at the time of the test (Tr-9,16);
(3)

Did not identify the type of cream or

fixative used (Tr-9,126);
(4)

Did not state a definitive or definite

variance of the false high reading from the correct
reading (Tr-9,16);
(5)

Did not indicate when the test was run in

relation to the consumption (Tr-126);
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(6)

Did not state what type of alcohol was used

or even if it was an alcoholic beverage (Tr-16,126);
(7)

Did not state whether the particular

fixative used in the study would absorb alcohol as a
matter of course, and, if so, to what degree, nor how
long the residual effect would last.
15.

(Tr-126).

Mr. Tafesh was allowed to testify at length at trial

concerning his education, qualifications and experience, his
familiarity with the infrared spectrophotometer and the
intoxilyzer, and concerning a study conducted in Colorado which
he had read involving the effect of denture cream upon an
intoxilyzer test.

(Tr-106-109).

He testified that in that

particular test the use of a denture cream falsely affected the
intoxilyzer test result.

(Tr-109).
VI

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Foundational Requirements.

All foundational requirements for the admission of the
intoxilyzer test results were met in the instant case.
Appellant-Rascon failed to show that there was in fact denture
cream in his mouth at the time of the intoxilyzer test, and he
failed to lay a proper foundation to challenge the admissibility
of the test results.
2.

Jury Weighs Evidence.

The jury was properly allowed to hear and weigh Appellant's
evidence challenging the credibility of the intoxilyzer test
results, as an issue of fact.
-8-

3.

Harmless Error,

Even if the admission of the intoxilyzer results was error,
it was harmless error in view of the overwhelming additional
evidence presented at trial indicating Appellantfs guilt.
4.

Appeal Waiver.

Appellant-Rascon has waived his right to appeal the denial
of the pretrial suppression motion because no findings or order
were entered and the motion was not again renewed.
VIII
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER RESULTS
WERE MET IN THIS INSTANCE.
A.

THE SO-CALLED "BAKER RULE" WAS
ADHERED TO.

Appellant-Rascon has argued that the results of the breath
test in this instance should have been suppressed by the court
because the so-called Baker rule allegedly was not adhered to.
However, the facts herein indicate that the Baker rule was
followed in every respect in this case.
The rule enunciated in State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806, (a 1960
Washington case) is that two of the foundational requirements for
admission of the results of a breath test are that the officer
administering the test must:

(1) examine the subject's mouth to

verify that the subject had nothing in his mouth at the time of
the test; and (2) keep the subject under observation for at least
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fifteen minutes prior to the test to insure that the subject
takes nothing by mouth during that period.

The purpose of the

fifteen minute observation period is "to allow any alcohol
present in the mouth to be absorbed in the skin."

State v.

Baker, Id., at 811.
In Baker, the officer neither examined the subject's mouth
before giving the test nor kept him under observation for the
required fifteen minutes.

In the instant case, the officer

examined Appellant-RasconTs mouth prior to the test and found no
foreign substances therein.

(Tr-11,12,45,46,61). Mr. Rascon

indicated he had nothing in his mouth upon being asked by the
officer at the time of the examination of th€i mouth.

(Tr-45,46).

The officer kept the subject under observation for the required
fifteen minute period before administering the test and observed
that he took nothing by mouth.

(Tr-14,45,46).

In fact, the

officer testified that approximately thirty minutes elapsed
during the observation period prior to the test.

(Tr-14).

Clearly the foundational requirements of the Baker rule were
met in this instance.
B.

THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING THAT THERE
WAS DENTURE CREAM IN APPELLANTRASCON'S MOUTH AT THE TIME OF THE
TEST.

Appellant-Rascon?s written pretrial Motion to Suppress dated
July 27, 1987 argued for suppression of the result of the
intoxilyzer test on but one ground:

that "the defendant had a

foreign substance in her [sic] mouth at the time the test was

administered".

(Record-14).

The Appellant argues that, since he

had used a cream as a denture fixative at some unspecified time
prior to his arrest, the presence of the denture cream at the time
of the test "was established and the intoxilyzer results should
have been suppressed on this basis alone."

(Brief of Appellant at

p. 4 ) .
Such reasoning is faulty, since the fact that he may have
taken such cream earlier does not establish that it was still in
his mouth at the time of the test.

No testimony was presented as

to how long before the test was administered Appellant-Rascon
used the cream.

No testimony was presented as to how long it

takes for the particular cream which was used by Rascon to
dissipate or to be absorbed.

The officer testified that he did

not observe a foreign substance in the defendantf s mouth at the
time he examined it.
uncontradicted.

(Tr-11,12,45,46).

That testimony was

There clearly has been no showing by Appellant-

Rascon that there was denture cream in his mouth as the time of
the test.
C.

THE WQMACK COURT CLARIFIED THE BAKER
RULE BY RECOGNIZING THAT THE VERY
PURPOSE FOR THE OBSERVATION PERIOD
IS TO ALLOW FOR ANY FOREIGN
SUBSTANCES TO BE ABSORBED.

In the recent case of Salt Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d
1039 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"In fact, in almost every instance, a breath test
administered sometime after the traffic stop will be
advantageous to the D.U.I, suspect in two ways.
First, a foreign substance present in the mouth which
might produce an artificially high result will be

removed by absorption during the observation period.
Second, in the interval between the traffic stop and
the breath test, some of the blood alcohol usually
will have been metabolized, resulting in a slightly
lower test." Salt Lake City v. Womack, Id., at 1042
(footnote two).
Under this ruling, any foreign substance which might have
been present in defendants mouth, but not observable by the
officer in his examination of the mouth, which might have
produced an artificially high result, would have been absorbed
during the observation period.
waiting period.

That is the purpose of the

Neither Baker nor Womack require the officer to

assure that the subject's mouth is absolutely free of all
microscopic substances not observable upon reasonable examination
by the naked eye.

Also, in the present case, the observation

period was at least thirty minutes (Tr-14) which, as stated in
Womack, would have resulted in an even lower test result.
POINT II
EFFECT OF DENTAL CREAM WAS A QUESTION OF
FACT FOR JURY, DUE TO APPELLANT'S
FAILURE TO LAY PROPER FOUNDATION
CHALLENGING ADMISSIBILITY OF TEST.
A.

APPELLANT FAILED TO LAY A PROPER
FOUNDATION TO CHALLENGE ADMISSIBILITY OF INTOXILYZER TEST.

The only evidence presented by Appellant-Rascon challenging
the admissibility of the intoxilyzer test results was the
testimony of Mr. Ahmed Tafesh.

The court properly refused to

qualify Mr. Tafesh as an expert witness to express an opinion
that the use of denture cream falsely inflated the results of the
intoxilyzer test.

(Tr-108-109).

Mr. Rascon failed to lay a
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proper foundation to challenge the admissibility of the
intoxilyzer test results in at least the following respects:
1.

Mr. Tafesh had never personally run any blood alcohol

tests involving the intoxilyzer nor conducted any studies
regarding the effect of dentures or denture fixatives upon
intoxilyzer test results (Tr-6,7,125);
2.

Mr. Tafesh could cite only one study which he had

read, the results of which were published in Colorado (Tr-710,16,125);
3.

That study:
(a)

Did not identify the number of participants (Tr-

9,16);
(b)

Did not identify the conditions of the subjects

at the time of the test (Tr-9,16);
(c)

Did not identify the type of cream or fixative

used (Tr-9,126);
(d)

Did not state a definitive or definite variance

of the false high reading from the correct reading (Tr9,16);
(e)

Did not indicate when the test was run in

relation to the consumption (Tr-126);
(f)

Did not state what type of alcohol was used or

even if it was an alcoholic beverage (Tr-16,126); and
(g)

Did not state whether the particular fixative

used in the study would absorb alcohol as a matter of
course, and, if so, to what degree, nor how
residual effect would last.
-13-

(Tr-126).

long the

Appellant-Rascon had the duty to show that due to the use
of the denture cream in his case, there was a variance in the
intoxilyzer test result in excess of 300%.

This conclusion is

true because, to bring the test result of .25% below the .08%
legal limit, the denture cream effect would of mathematical
necessity have had to produce such an error.

Not only was

Appellant-Rascon unable to show that there would have been a
300% variance, but Mr. Ahmed Tafesh acknowledged that he was
unable to assess what kind of variance might result from the use
of denture cream.

On cross examination at the pretrial

suppression hearing, the following exchange occurred:
"Q:

And you have not performed any studies in
regards to dentures, is that correct"

A:

No.

Q:

Nor in regard to denture cream?

A:

No.

Q:

Nor would you be able to assess the kind of
variance that might result as - because a person
would have dentures or denture cream?

A:

No.
B.

But

".

(Tr-6-7).

EVIDENCE REGARDING EFFECT OF DENTAL
CREAM WAS WEIGHED BY JURY AS AN
ISSUE OF FACT.

Under Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence, the preliminary
legal question concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness shall be determined by the court, but that rule does not
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence
relative to weight or credibility.
Rules of Evidence.

-14-

Rule 104(a) and (e), Utah

In the instant case, although the court refused to qualify
Mr. Ahmed Tafesh as an expert, Mr. Tafesh was nevertheless
allowed to testify at length during the trial.

In fact, Mr.

Tafeshfs trial testimony was virtually as extensive as his
testimony at the pretrial hearing, except for the expression of
his "expert" opinion.

(Tr-3-9,106-109).1

Mr. Tafesh testified

before the jury concerning his education and advanced degrees,
his qualifications and experience, his familiarity with the
principles of infrared spectrophotometry, and his studies and
observations concerning the intoxilyzer instrument.
108).

(Tr-106-

He testified concerning the study he had read regarding

the test conducted at the health department in Colorado involving
the effect of denture cream upon an intoxilyzer test.

He

testified that in that particular test the use of a denture cream
falsely affected the intoxilyzer test result, although he did not
state the extent of the variance.

(Tr-109).

The jury was allowed to hear and weigh the testimony of Mr.
Tafesh in determining the credibility of the results of the
intoxilyzer test.

It was the jury's prerogative to disbelieve or

to give little weight to Mr. Tafeshfs testimony and, instead, to
believe, based upon the test results, that Appellant-Rascon's
Although the court's refusal to allow Mr. Tafesh to express his
opinion is not an issue on appeal, it should be noted that said
ruling was proper since he did not qualify as an expert under
Rule 104, Utah Rules of Evidence. However, if Mr. Tafesh had
opined, he could only have opined as to the denture cream's
having an effect on the test results-not as to the degree of
effect.

-15-

blood alcohol content was, in fact, in excess of the legal limit
of .08%.

The jury determination of an issue* of fact must be

sustained in the absence of a showing that the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict, so clearly
preponderated in Appellant's favor that reasonable persons could
not differ on the outcome of the case.

Groen v. Tri-0-Inc, 667

P.2d 598 (Utah 1083); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah
1983).
POINT III
EVEN IF THE INTOXILYZER TEST RESULT WAS
INADMISSIBLE, ITS ADMISSION WAS HARMLESS
ERROR UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS
CASE.
The other evidence in this case of Appellant-Rascon's guilt
is so overwhelming, that even if the admission of the intoxilyzer
evidence was error, it was harmless error.

The facts which

support the jury's verdict in this case, in addition to the
intoxilyzer test results, include the following:
1.

Appellant-Rascon staggered as he walked to his car

(Tr-25);
2.

As he operated his vehicle he repeatedly weaved into

another lane of traffic and accelerated very rapidly to speeds in
excess of the speed limit between semaphore lights (Tr-26,27);
3.

Appellant-Rascon exuded an odor of an alcoholic

beverage, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was "thick"
(Tr-27,29,30);
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4.

Upon getting out of his vehicle he was unsteady on his

feet and several times had to support himself against the
officer's vehicle (Tr-29);
5.

He attempted to perform three field sobriety tests; a

heel-toe test, a finger counting test, and an alphabet recitation
test (Tr-30-34).

Mr. Rascon failed each test ; he:

(a) had

difficulty reciting the alphabet from A to Z, forgetting some
letters and not completing the recitation (Tr-33); (b) he tried
the finger counting test but could not count and was unable to
coordinate it or finish the test (Tr-33); and (c) on attempting
the heel-toe test, he was unable to perform it without staggering
considerably and had to sidestep to regain his balance (Tr-33).
6.

Based upon all of the aforementioned facts and speaking

as a qualified expert with respect to persons under the influence
of alcohol, the officer expressed his opinion that at the time he
stopped Appellant-Rascon1s vehicle Appellant was under the
influence of alcohol.

(Tr-36).

The law is clear that evidence erroneously admitted at trial
will be viewed as harmless error where there is no reasonable
likelihood in the absence of such evidence that there would have
been a different result.
(1986).

State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129

See also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (1986); State v.

Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980).
There is such overwhelming additional evidence in the
instant case to sustain the jury's verdict, that it can be
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that if the admission of the
intoxilyzer result was error, such error was harmless.
-17-

POINT IV
APPELLANT-RASCON HAS WAIVED RIGHT TO
RAISE ISSUE ON APPEAL REGARDING DENIAL
OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
No written findings of fact and conclusions of law, no
written order, signed minute entry denying Appellant-Rasconfs
pretrial motion to suppress were entered in the court record
following the evidentiary hearing.

In fact, no such findings or

order have ever been executed in this matter.
Appellant failed to renew the motion to suppress at the
beginning of the trial, made no reference to the prior motion
during trial, made no objection to the introduction of the
intoxilyzer results at the time they were proffered, and made no
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the prosecution's case nor
prior to the case going to the jury.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that:
"[A] specific objection [at trial] is required even
where a pretrial motion to suppress has been made,
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), because
?
the judge often has a more complete view of the
evidence and the grounds for its suppression or
admission than he or she does before trial. 1 " State
vs. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1985).
The Appellant-Rascon argues that since there was a full
pretrial suppression hearing by the same judge which presided at
the trial in this case, Lesley is inapplicable under the holding
of State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987).

However, in

Johnson, in addition to the same judge presiding at the
suppression hearing and at trial, it was "quite clear from the
record that defense counsel did not intend to waive any related
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evidentiary objections at trial."
1076.

(State v. Johnson, Id., at

Justice Durham stated in her concurring opinion that:
"In fact, several ambiguous references during trial
to a "prior motion" may have referred to defendant's
pretrial motion to suppress. It is important . . .
that trial judges be given the opportunity to review
pretrial suppression rulings when and if they were
erroneous." State v. Johnson, Id., at 1976.
Although the same judge presided at the suppression hearing

and at the trial herein, this case is more analogous to the
Lesley situation where there were no findings of fact and
conclusions of law nor written ruling regarding the prior motion.
The trial in this instance was forty-two days after the
suppression hearing, and no reference whatsoever was made to the
suppression motion, until the Appellant filed his brief on
appeal.
In addition, counsel for Appellant objected to the
Respondent's drafting proposed findings in January, 1988, well
after this appeal was filed.

Letter from Larry V. Spendlove to

the Honorable Maurice Jones dated January 20, 1988 (R-73,74).
Because of these distinctions, the ruling in Johnson should be
distinguished and the Appellant should be barred from raising an
issue which he has heretofore waived.
CONCLUSION
The admission at trial of the intoxilyzer test result was
proper since all foundational requirements were met.

The "Baker

Rule", as clarified by Womack, was adhered to and there was no
showing that Appellant-Rascon had denture cream in his mouth at
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the time of the test.

The effect of the dental cream was a

question of fact for the jury, because of Appellant's failure to
lay a proper foundation challenging the admissibility of the
test.

However, even if the intoxilyzer test result was

inadmissible, its admission was harmless error in view of the
overwhelming additional evidence of Appellant-Rascon1s guilt.
Further, Appellant waived his right to appeal the denial of a
suppression motion.
The conviction should be affirmed and remanded for
execution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1988.

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney

LARRY V. SPENDLOVE
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent
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